Securing gasoline-dispensing facilities from attack
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Authors
Villalon, Rizal
Issue Date
2008
Type
Thesis
Language
en
Keywords
Homeland security , Safety engineering
Alternative Title
Abstract
On September 11, 2001 terrorists successfully used large quantities of aviation gasoline as a weapon of mass destruction to destroy large iconic buildings in the United States. Federal regulations have since tightened the airline industry. However, 170,000 widely distributed public-access gasoline-dispensing facilities (GDFs) throughout the U.S. are inadequately secured from adversarial acts. Despite the lessons learned in the post 9/11 incident, physical security and fire prevention equipment in the gasoline dispensing facilities have remained the same. Visual observations on GDFs during this study revealed that majority of the external and internal covers for the common 10,000 to 20,000 gallon gasoline underground storage tanks are installed without security locks. There appears to be no physical security provided to GDF housing thousands of gallons of highly flammable gasoline. Simultaneous and re-occurring attacks on several well used GDFs resulting in large fires will cause the United States significant panic among public and commuting disruptions resulting in more defined economic harm with wider impact than terror attacks on iconic infrastructures. Clearly, the lack of governance in providing appropriate security for GDFs against attack is an oversight of our national security. This study reviews the security measures undertaken at typical gasoline-dispensing facilities (GDFs). Through research based on published literature, journals, and articles, this study provides new countermeasures required of GDFs to operate more securely. In addition, specific risk-mitigating structural design of a GDF is proposed to help deter, delay, and/or limit the vulnerability of a service gasoline station.